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THE DILEMMA OF CONSUMER ADVOCACY 
Roger G. Noll':< 
California Institute of Technology 
In the past few years political leaders from the full range of 
the ideological spectrum have begrm to give serious consideration to 
several proposals to overhaul the scope and structure of regulation. 
In some instances, significant reductions in the scope of regulation 
have either been adopted (brokerage commissions) or are being seri­
ously considered (trunk airlines). These and other examples reflect 
the growing opinion that regulation, no matter how effective, has 
nothing beneficial to contribute to the performance of some regulated 
industries. 
Another class of reform proposals reflects a somewhat dif­
ferent criticism of regulatory agencies. These proposals seek to 
change the structure and process of regulation. They are motivated 
by the belief that, while some unregulated rnarkets do not perform 
well, regulatory institutions have not b
.
een very successful in 
improving matters. Reform proposals of this type take rr1any forms, 
such as changes in the number of administrators of an agency, in the 
agency1 s location in the governmental organization chart, and in the 
allocation of responsibilities among agencies. Perhaps the most novel 
* I am grat_eful for research assistance provided by Barry Weingast 
and, as Usual, for comments and encouragement from Paul Joskow. 
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reform is the creation of a governmental agency to intervene in the pro­
ceedings of regulatory agencies as an advocate of the consumer. 
This paper focuses on the likely behavior and effects of a 
consumer advocacy agency. In so doing it abstracts from three related 
issues except insofar as they bear directly on the performance of a 
consumer advocate. These other issues are: (1) the case for sub­
stantial deregulation in several areas; (2) the reasons for governmental 
intervention in private markets; and (3) the various structural reform 
proposals, such as those proposed by the President1s Advisory Council 
on Executive Organization (the Ash Council). This paper presumes 
that all reasonable men can agree that some current regulatory activities 
are unnecessary (e. g. , the Federal Communications Commission favors 
cutbacks in the extent to which radio and television licenses are regulated), 
while others are probably desirable (e.g. , Ralph K. Winter, Jr. , believes 
in certain standard-setting regulatory activities, such as those affecting 
children's safety_!). The paper avoids issues relating to changing the 
_/ Ralph K. Winter, Jr. , The Consumer Advocate vs. the Consumer, 
Special Analysis #26, Amer:ican Enterprise Institute, L972.
internal structure of agencies since I have expressed my generally 
pessimistic view of the likely benefits of these reforms at tedious 
length elsewhere.-/ 
_/ Roger G. Noll, Reforming Regulation: An Evaluation of the Ash 
Council Proposals (Washingtori, D. C.: Brookings Institution), 1971.
The following two sections review and elaborate upon the 
arguments for and against a consumer advocacy agency. The final 
section synthesizes these partial analyses, attempting to provide a 
somewhat more complete and coherent theory of the agency than 
either side of the controversy has presented. The conclusion of the 
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paper, as intimated by the title, is that the creation of the agency has 
both costs and benefits to consumers, the relative magnitudes of which 
can not be determined on the basis of theoretical and empirical informa­
tion currently at hand. In the end, the debate over the wisdom of 
creating the agency is one of competing judg1nents, not scientific; fact 
just like so many of the regulatory issues that the agency is supposed 
to tackle. 
Before proceeding, a definition is in order. By consumer 
advocacy agency, I mean an agency with a separate budget and separate 
legislative program that is concerned with the direct, private effects 
of consumer products on consumers. The agency will consider prices, 
product safety and quality, and the truthfulness of product information 
provided by producers. Among its activities will be formal intervention 
in regulatory proceedings, judicial appeals of agency decisions, informal 
contact with personnel in Other agencies, in the consumerist movement 
and even in industry, and participation in Co11gressional hearings and 
investigations related to consumer affairs. It will not have any direct 
regulatory or prosecutorial powers, and it v1ill not be the advocate 
for ·other 11public interest11 groups, such as environmentalists, labor, 
small businesses, farmers, pensioners, etc .. To the contrary, it 
would , in principle at least, oppose these interest groups should they 
favor policies that impose significant costs on consumers. 
Admittedly, this definition of a consumer advocate does not 
reflect the agency described in any legislation, passed or propose
,
d.
Congress has not expressed interest in creating its own watchdog, 
but it has considered bogging down the agency with concern for small 
businessmen and farmers, both of whom already have effective bureau­
cratic protectors. Neither does the foregoing definition specify the 
details of the agency1 s rights and powers. The definition is offered to 
capture the essence of a pure consumer advocacy agency as a point of 
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departure for further analysis of the agency1 s aims, policies and 
effects. 
THE CASE FOR A CONSUMER ADVOCATE 
The principal argument that has been put forth in support of 
creating an advocate for consumer interests is, in essence, an appeal 
to the concept of procedural d"!-e process. Proponents of an advocacy 
agency for consumers base their case on two observations about regula­
tion: first, agencies often make decisions that sacrifice the i nterests 
of consumers to those of other groups, notably producers, and second, 
producers and other well-organized special interests are far more 
likely to be represented in the formal proceedings of an agency than 
are consumers. The proponents conclude by arguing that these two 
observations are, plausibly, causally related, so that redressing the 
imbalance of representation will move regulatory decisions more in 
favor of consumers. 
Few would disagree with either generalization upon which the 
case for a consumer advocate is based. The theoretical models pre­
dicting a pro-producer bias in regulatory outcomes will be discussed 
briefly below; suffice to say here that in the 1970s it is rare, indeed, 
to find an article in the popular press or the professional literature 
that does not chastise regulators for 11crawling in bed with industry. rr_/ 
_/The most recent paper of which I_ am aware that extolls the 
performance of regulators is the enthusiastic, if Pollyannaish, 
offering by A. J. G. Priest, 11Possible Adaption of Public Utility 
Concepts in the Health Care Field, 11 Law and Contemporary Problems 
35 (1970). 
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Like most generalizations, the meaning of this one deserves careful, 
explicit definition. Only Marxists contend that agencies do exactly as 
producers bid� most others find some truth in the claim of businessmen 
that regulation does alter firm behavior in ways contrary to the firm1s 
interests. What is really being said in the accusation that regulation 
is pro-producer is that, on balance, regulation tends to make the life 
of producers somewhat more secure than it otherwise would be, 
particularly with respect to the threat that a.n established firm will 
be displaced by a competititve entrant into its market. 
That consumers are usually unrepresented in regulatory 
affairs is well-documented, although the ext.ent to which consumerist 
intervenors do participate is certainly on the rise. One would expect 
consumers, as a group, to have less representation in relation to their 
stake in agency decisions than do producer groups. Consumers 
constitute a far larger, more heterogeneous group than do firms in 
a regulated industry. In general, the larger the group and the more 
diverse the preferences of its members, then the greater is the 
per capita cost of organizing the group and of reaching a group decision 
about its collective choice among alternatives. In addition, the· larger 
the group the less important-to the success of the group is participa­
tion by any single member. Hence a member of a large group has an 
incentive not to pay the costs of participation since the benefit he will 
receive will be only slightly affected by his decision to join. 
If the total stake of two groups in a decision is equal and if 
the effectiveness of their representation is related to expenditures 
incurred through participation in the decisiQn-mal::ing process, the 
larger group will be less likely to be represiented because: (a) its 
organization costs will be higher, (b) it will face a problem with free 
riders .. and (c} it will have less chance of success -- and therefore 
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less reason to act -- than if the group's representation were pro-
portional to its stake in the issue. In the case of consumers, all of 
these factors are essentially at work to their maximal extent. Most 
individuals have a tiny personal stake in any given regulatory issue; 
they would hardly find it worthwhile to join an organization that would 
represent them in the proceedings that deal with it. Nevertheless, 
to the extent a regulatory decision generates monopolistic practices 
(but not perfectly discriminatory ones) where competition would other­
wise prevail,, the total gains to the producers will fall short of the 
total costs to consumers.-/ 
_/ This will be true unless the rest of the economy is particularly 
perversely structured. Presumably the purpose of regulation is not 
to find an elusive second-best by eliminating the few bastions of 
perfect competition in an economy otherwise overflowing with con­
centrated markets, high transaction costs� externalities, incomplete 
opportunities for trading contingent claims, and the like. 
The preceeding argument does not imply that only the supply 
side of a regulated market will be effectively represented. Some 
users of the output of regulated firms are members of relatively 
small, homogeneous interest groups. In proceedings before the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, for example, state and local 
governments have opposed route-abandonment proposals by railroadsQ 
And, of course, industry trade associations and large firms have 
oppo�ed proposals that would cause them economic harm. In fact. 
the most effective group -- and the beneficiary of the 11pro-producer 
bias11 -- is frequently an industry that is a user of the output of the 
regulated firm. Their gains can come at the expense of individual 
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households, poorly represented industries, and the regulated £1rms. 
In the ensuing discussion, then, pro-producer bias in regulatory 
outcomes refers to all biases in favor of well-represented groups of 
firms, regardless of which side of the regulated market they find 
themselves. Although it does some violence to language to include. 
by implication, poorly represented industries in the class of consumers, 
as a practical matter is probably is not a misleading generalization. 
Their lack of representation, for reasons given above, is likely to 
flow from their competitiveness -- they face high organization costs 
because they are comprised of nmnerous firms. Hence, cost increases 
imposed on them by regulators will in the en.cl be passed through to 
their customers, rather than extracted from. excess profits. 
The point of controversy in the positive case for a consumer 
advocate is whether the generalizationS about consumer representation 
and pro-producer bias are causally connected. Whether a consumer 
advocate could significantly alter regulatory outcomes depends upon 
the 
,a
bjectives of the regulators and the relationship of inputs to outputs 
in the regulatory process. If the regulatory process were aptly char­
acterized by either its description in high school civics texts or the 
extensive literature in economics on the behavior of the firm under 
regulatory constraint _/ the consumer advocacy agency would not 
_/ Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson, 11Behavior of the Firm 
Under Regulatory Constraint, 11 American Economic Review 52 (December 
I962)i and W. J, Baumol and A. Klevorick, 11Input Choices and Rate-of­
Return Regulation: An Overview and Discussion, 11 Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 1 (Autwnn 1970).
have an effect on regulatory outcomes. According to thiS view of 
regulation, the regulatory agency is already an effective consumer 
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advocate. Its objective is to conRtrain the behavior of private firms in 
imperfect inarkets by setting prices and profit rates or by establishing 
minimum performance standards. The world in which the agency 
operates is one in which information about demand and costs, both now and 
in the future, is available with sufficient precision that regulators can 
determine with reasonable accuracy a socially optimal policy. The 
agency is established because the legislative process is too cursory, 
and probably too corrupt, to be expected to deal effectively with cor­
recting market imperfections'. Hence, to attain re-gulatory objectives, 
an expert independent body is created that will learn the details of 
the operation of an industry so that it can develop operating constraints 
on firm behavior that will ameliorate market imperfections while still 
leaving the industry econcrnically viable. 
In such a world, the consumer advocate has no role. The 
regulatory agency already has the information it needs on the opera-
tions of the regulated industry, and already is suffused with the desire 
to serve the interests of consumers. Of course, about the only people 
remaining who believe that this description of the regulatory process 
is realistic are the agencies themselves, and their comments in 
response to the proposal to create a consumer advocacy agency follow 
this same line of reasoning. For example, the Postal Rate Commission 
reminded Congress that it always appoints a staff member to represent 
the con-sumer in all of its rate hearings, The Atomic Energy Commission 
(prior to its fission) regarded the proposed agency as 11unnecessarily 
duplicative11 since it already protected consumers against unsafe nuclear 
reactors and accepted the Antitrust Division's advice on protecting 
consumers against detrimental anticompetitive effects of nuclear power 
facili'ties. The Federal Power Commission 11does not recognize the 
need • • •  for protection of consumer interest insofar as our responsi­
bilities as delegates of Congress are concerned. 11 The FPC gives a 
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classic defense of its position that bears repeating: 
The taak of a conswner protection agency in regulating inter-
state electric and natural gas utility service is, of necessity, 
highly specialized and demands the services of knowledgeable 
experts who can be depended upon to bring all facets of a 
particular problem to the attention of the agency. Over the 
years, the staff of the Federal Power Con1mission has 
accepted its legal obligation to provide forthright presenta-
tion and advocacy of the consumer viewpoint before the Com­
mission and the Courts. In addition to staff represenation and 
conswner participation directly or through consumer a$socia­
tions, the consumer interest is also effectively represented 
by gas distributors, state commissions, environmental 
organizations in many instances, and others who participate 
regularly as parties or intervenors in Comn'lission proceedings._/ 
_/ The foregoing quotations and characterizations of agency posi­
tions are all from U. S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations 
and Committee on Commerce, To Establish an Independent Consumer 
Protection Agency: Joint Hearings, 93rd Congress, First Session, 
1973. 
Ii+ contrast to this idealistic self-in1age, some observers 
believe that regulation never was intended to protect consumers. 
Instead, it was designed and is operated to reduce competition among 
producers. Marxists see regulation as an institutional innovation of 
the capitalist ruling class to improve the possibility for monopoly 
profits. _/ 
_/ See Gabriel Kolk0, Railroads and Regulation (Princeton: Prince­
ton University Press), 1965. 
Stigler predicts a similar result, with the main difference 
being that firms and professional organizations must purChase anti­
competitive insitutions from a legislature that, rather like a firm, 
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maximizes the gains of its members from the granting of institutional 
favors.-/ 
_/ George Stigler, 11The Theory of Economic Regulation, 11 Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (Spring 1971 ).
If either theory is roughly correct, giving consumers more 
representation in the regulatory process is unlikely to alter regulatory 
outcomes, since the mandate and procedural requirements of the agency 
have already 'been designed to enable the agency to make decisions in 
favor of prod�cer groups. Procedural due process does not create an 
ability to influence decisions .unless the decision-making body, whether 
a court, a legislature or a regulatory agency, either enters the process 
with a set of objectives that differ in some significant way from the 
objectives of one of the interests participating in the process, or has 
concrete, specific rules that require certain substantive results 
should interests other than producers support them. Otherwise, the 
agency can satisfy the procedural requirements by allowing all interests 
to participate, citing all the legal, economic and other evidence sub­
mitted, and then simply finding unpersuasive the arguments in opposi­
tion to the producers. 
Since the decline of substantive due process, dating from 
Nebbia v. New York, courts have generally steered clear of reviewing 
agency decisions on more than procedural grounds. _/ Consequently, 
_/According to the Court: 
So far as the requirement .of due proces.s is concerned, and 
in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is 
free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be 
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy 
by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without 
authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared 
by the legislative arm, to override it. If the laws passed are 
seen to have. a reasonable relation to a proper legislative 
purpose, and ·are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, 
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the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial 
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio . 
• • •  With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy 
or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts 
are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal. . . .  
Price control, like any other form of regulation, is 
unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or 
demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is 
free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted 
interference with individual liberty. [Nebbia v. Nev;r York, 
54 S. Ct. 55 ( 1934)]
While the case at hand dealt with an issue of state regulation, the 
principles enunciated therein have generally been followed with 
respect to judicial review of regulatory law and agency decisions. 
the agency faces no necessity to bend its decisions in the direction of 
consumerist intervenors a:s long as it accords them whatever procedural 
rights a court will demand._/ 
_/ As an aside, where in the Marxist or Stigleresque regulatory 
theory is there an explanation for establishing a powerless consumer 
advocate? One possibility is that 11public interest11 lawyers are intent 
on creating more demand for their services. Although this seems far­
fetched owing to the meager number of public interest lawyers, it is 
interesting that the American Trial Lawyers A.ssociati�n supports 
the creation of a Consumer Protection Agency. Another possibility 
is that creation of a consumer advocacy agency deflects the attentions 
of consumerists from Congress and regulators, defusing some of the 
political demand for less industry-oriented policies. This latter pos­
sibility is investigated in the next section. 
In order for a consumer advocacy agency to have an effect on 
regulatory outcomes, a somewhat more complicated conceptual model 
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of the regulatory p<occs s is required. If the decisions of the regula­
tory agency are somewhat inore pro-producer than were intended by 
the legislature in giving an agency its mandates, the agency1 s decisions 
may be successfully appealed to the courts by nonproducer partici­
pants in the regulatory process. For example, environmentalist 
groups have provided numerous examples of the use of the court 
system to force recalcitrant agencies to consider environmental con­
sequences of their decisions. In fact, most federal regulatory agencies 
refused to consider environmental issues in their cases until instructed 
to do so by the courts upon appeal of agency decisions by environ-· 
mentalists. Although each agency has its precedental environmental 
case, the classic example is the Calvert Cliffs case in which three 
intervening groups -- the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and the 
Committee for a Sane No.clear Policy -- successfully appealed a 
license for a nuclear power facility that was granted by the Atomic 
Energy Commission. The claim of the intervenors, which was accepted 
by the courts, was that the AEC had failed to consider the environmental 
consequences of the construction of the nuclear power facility, contrary 
to the dictates of existing legislation and executive orders. 
The decision by most agencies to avoid environmental issues until 
forced to do so by the courts was certainly consistent with the interests 
of producers, and even of consumers qua consumers, Requiring that 
agencies consider environmental issues may increase the likelihood 
that a particular proposed action by a firm will not be approved 
(although this is, in practice, not common). It always increases the 
cost of obtaining regulatory approval of a proposed action, however, 
and often leads to the producer. incurring greater design costs in the 
investments or products for which it seeks regulatory approval. And 
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One must conclude that intervention in regulatory proceedings 
by environmentalists has paid some dividends to the environmentalist 
movement. At the very least, intervention has reduced the likelihood 
that a firm will obtain timely approval of actions (by increasing the cost) 
that are contrary to the environmentalists' perception of their interests. 
This, of course, does not establish that consumer advoc3.tes 
will have a similar effect, for regulatory agencies, with few exceptions, 
have never regarded themselves as protectors of the environment, 
although they all proclaim a self-image as a consumer protector. 
Furthermore, the victories of the environn1entalists have been 
obtained by private groups, not a federal environmental advocacy 
agency. In order to claim that the consumer advocacy agency would 
be effective one must develop a theory of the regulatory process that 
predicts a systematic pro-poducer bias in agency decisions that is not 
the legislative intent and -that results from inadequate consumerist 
representatation in the process. In other words, one must show that 
the systemic features of regulation which lead to a producer bias in 
outcomes are the direct consequence of the identity and strength of 
the groups intervening in agency decisions. 
Numerous theoretical models of the re-gulatory process do 
produce such a prediction. _/ Suppose that whatever the objective of
_/ No attempt to survey theories of regulation will be made here. 
Elsewhere I have made such an attempt: see Roger G. Noll, 11Govern­
ment Admirilstrative Behavior and Technological Innovation, 11 Social 
Science Working Paper #62, California Institute of Technology, 
November 1974. 
some of these costs will be passed on to consumers. the agency, its performance is either crudely measured or determined 
by the following class of agency indicators: budget, fate of 
legislative program, number of rules promulgated and cases 
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decided, economic health of regulated firms, ability to avoid appeals 
of decisions -- particularly successful appeals -- and the tone of 
press reviews of the agency's activities. Of course, depending upon 
the particular theoretical model, these various indices can be 
systematically related in complicated ways� For example, reversals 
of agency decisions by the courts may be undesirable because (a) 
they cause the Congress and the Office of Management and Budget to 
g·rant the agency a smaller budget; (b) they reflect upon the competence 
of the highest agency officials, thereby reducing their future employ­
ment possibilities in the private sector; or (c) they simply provide 
a signal to the agency that it is not adequately serving the ephemera� 
public interest that it likes to think of itself as maximizing. 
In principle, of course, a direct measure of the agency1s 
net economic impact would be preferable to this class of indirect 
measures as an indicator of the agency1s performance. But the 
agency may not see itself as maximizing economic welfare, or may 
regard these indicators as so closely related to its effects on economic 
welfare that it need look no farther, or may regard the measurement 
of economic welfare so difficult that it settles for measures of its 
standing among those with whom it has the greatest contact -- the 
courts, the Congress and, most of all, regulated firms and other 
interests that are well-represented in its proceeding·s. The point 
here is simply that agencies11 for whatever reason, may rely on these 
other
_
, less direct success indicators in evaluating themselves. As 
long as this is the case, agencles will have an incentive to decide 
uncontested issues in favor of whatever interests are represented 
in their proceedings. This minimizes the resources committed to 
the case, makes appeal of the decision unlikely (normally only 
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participants in the process can appeal, and there is little incentive 
to appeal a decision that grants a group most of what it wants), and, 
if the producer group is rational, contributes to the economic health 
of the regulated industry. Intervention by a consumer group -- or 
any other nonproducer interest -- according to this point of view, 
will eliminate whatever incentive the agency would have to go beyond 
the legislative intent in favoring the producer group by introducing the 
penalty of a successful appeal should such decisions be promulgated. 
Of course, decisions by regulatory agencies presumably 
depend on rr1ore than the fact of representation -- the process is more 
than a politico-legal tug-of-warG The agencies are, by design, 
11expert11 bodies, which is to say the regulatory process is, in part, 
a mechanism for gathering� analyzing and evaluating technical 
information. Observers of the interactions between agencies and the 
budgeteers in Congress arid the Executive Office regard the expertise 
of the agency as one of its most potent weapons in attaining its 
budgetary objectives._/ In addition11 to the extent an agency accords 
_J For example; see Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the · 
Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown &: Co. , 1964).
any weight to the economic consequences of its decisions, it will pay 
some attention to the information that it is supplied about regulated 
activities. 
The importance of information in the regulatory process 
gives represented groups still another advantage in influencing 
decisions. If information is expensive and difficult to comprehend, 
a participant in the process can use information strategically to direct 
the policies of the agency. The adversary process is, in part, an 
embodiment of the recognition that strategic use of information is 
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possible. The procedural right to representation in a decision-making 
process affecting one1s welfare has substantive importance because 
it accords one the opportunity to present counter-evidence to show 
that the information presented by the opposition was incomplete, 
inaccurate, irrelevant or incorrectly analyzed. 
While a consumer representative might be expected to be 
effective in counteracting the most egregious examples of strategic 
use of information, it would still face some exacting problems� The 
source of information on costs and demand, present and future, is 
primarily the regulated industry. While some analysis can be 
successfully ·accomplished with the information supplied by firms to 
regulators, the underlying quality of the data - - and the data that are 
either never collected or never rnade available -- are imperfectly 
known at best. Thus, the consumer advocate, like the agency, is 
vulnerable to strategic use of information, particularly if it is not 
endowed with analytical resources on a par with those of the regulated 
industry. Furthermore, the unevenness between the consumer 
advocate and the producer groups in the amount and relevance of data 
that they possess will give the advocate less opportunity than the 
industry for using information strategically. 
This <loes not mean that the consumer advocate is doomed 
to reach the same conclusions as the agency staff, as has been 
suggeste"d. _/ The agency will have some independent sources of 
_I Statement of Ralph K, Winter, Jr. :1 in Joint Hearings. 
inforination -- particularly alternative methods and models for 
analyzing the data provided by other sources. In addition, the agency 
is likely to face different incentives, if not to have different motives:1 
than the regulatory body. The advocacy agency will� for example, 
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engage in a w�der variety of policy activities affecting a broader 
spectrum of interests than is typical of regulatory bodies. A regulatory 
agency normally deals with at most a handful of industries, and deals 
with each numerous times on different aspects of its regulatory 
mandate. Antagonizing one of its regulated industries can have 
repercussions on many other cases before the agency by making the 
industry less cooperative in supplying information or by causing the 
industry to wage political war on the agency by appealing its policies 
to Congress. An advocacy agency will have a lower proportion of 
its activity devoted to dealing with any given industry. Hence it will 
be less dependent on future cooperation from the industry, and less 
vulnerable should the industry attack its actions politically. Further­
more, as long as the advocacy agency is not extremely large compared 
to regulatory agencies, any given producer group will deal with the 
consumer advocate less frequently than with the agency that regulates 
it. As a result, it will have less incentive to capture the advocate 
than it has to control the regulators. 
Another difference between the advocate and the regulator is 
that the former has less stake in procedural measures of the success 
of the regulatory process. It will be less concerned than are 
regulators with the fact that a decision was reached or that the 
decision-maker gave the appearance of being neutral, objective and 
just -- in fact, in some cases the advocate will try to establish the 
opposite. The advocate will, presumably, achieve its objectives to 
the extent it changes regulatory outcomes, vvhereas producing an 
outcome of any form -- as long as it is legally unassailable -- has 
value to the regulator. 
A final factor that will influence the consumer advocate to 
behave differently than the regulator is that it will be far ·more likely 
to develop a political constituency among consumerist groups, if not 
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consUiners directly.. The agency will be a natural point of contact 
between governmental policy and consumer groups since the advocate 
presumably will be monitoring activities in numerous agencies. In 
order to be effective within the governmental hierarchy, an agency 
must develop constituencies -- groups that will defend the agency 
before Congress and in the media._} Constituencies develop in 
_J See Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process. 
part by the granting of favors and in part through frequent, informal 
contact with the agency. The latter can be especially important in the 
regulatory process since a relatively small proportion of the popul.ation 
pays much attention to it. Not only are consumerist groups the natural 
allies of the advocacy agency, they are the ones most likely to have a
powerful incentive to develop a continuing informal relationship with it. 
As with regulators and regulated, it would be natural for the advocacy 
agency and consumer groups each to be a source of employment for 
the other, and for each to share information about its current· 
activities to capture scale economies in information collection and 
dissemination. 
For all of these reasons the consumer advocate can be 
expected to have different objectives and to face a different set of 
incentives than the regulatory agency. In fact, the opposition of the 
established agencies to the creation of a consumer advocate is 
consistent with this theoretical conclusion. 1£ agencies were pure 
consumer advocates;, as their self-image suggests, they should 
welco"me a consumer advocacy .agency as a possible resource to 
marshal! in especially toughp important casesQ Or, if agencies were, 
in their formal decision-making mode� the neutral, judicial institutions 
that is also a part of their self-image� they would hardly fear 
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participation of representatives from a group whose welfare is 
dependent upon their decisions, much as a court of law would not be 
opposed to the existence of a public defender1s office. 
More likely, existing agencies oppose the establishment of 
an advocacy agency because it will, in fact, express a different point 
of view than that taken by the staff of the regulatory agency that has. 
the task of presenting the consumers1 stake in the matter, The causes 
for the differences can be many: either of the two may be mistaken, 
either may, in fact, be representing some interest other than that 
of consumers, or the information about the consequences of alternative 
policies may be sufficiently uncertain that it cannot support a choice 
among several policy conclusions (which, by implication� indicates 
that the decision carries more risk for consumers than one would 
infer if only one position were stated and defended in the proceedings)a_J 
_j This last point is the heart of an insightful criticism of the use 
of benefit-cost analysis in nuclear safety regulation. See Paul L. 
J oskow, 11Approving Nuclear Power Plants: Scientific Decision­
making or Administrative Charade, n Bell Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 5 #I (Spring 19 74).
If an agency does not want to be wrong, to be nexposed, 11 or to 
emphasize the uncertainties connected with its decisia:n (thereby 
undermining its illusion of expertise), it will find life more comfortable 
if it can monopolize representation of a general public interest. 
The main conclusion to be derived .from the preceeding 
analysis is that a consmner advocacy agency will change the incentives 
of regulatory agencies and thereby affect thEdr decisions. This does 
not mean that the agency will generate net social benefits; to reach 
that conclusion requires further analysis of the kinds of changes in 
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decisions the advocacy agency is likely to produce and the costs 
associated with producing those changes. Since the proponents of 
the advocacy agency have not addressed either of these issues in 
great detail, they will be explored in the discussion of the case against 
the advocacy agency. 
THE CASE AGAINST THE CONSUMER ADVOCATE 
The arguments agai:';1st the consumer advocacy agency fall 
into three classes. First, creation of the agency, it is argued, will 
increase the �osts of regulation, Second, the agency will generate some 
indirect costs through its effects on government policy and private 
enterprise. Third, the agency is unlikely to take positions that really 
serve an identifiable consumer interest, in part because its connection 
to consumers is minimal and in part because the interests of 
consumers are too diverse to be represented by a single advocate. 
This section will not deal with several analyses of the 
weaknesses of certain optional details of the agency1s structure, 
power or operations. Much of the debate in Congress has focused on 
the merits of alternative structures and mandates of the agency, 
rather than on the general issue of whether the agency should be 
cre·ated.-/ The only issue that could be classified as a detail that is 
_) For an excellent discussion of the details see the statement of 
Roger C. Cramton in Consumer Protection Legislation, Hearings 
Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government OperationsR 
Hous� of R epresentatives, 92nd Congress, 1971; and the statement 
of Antonin Scalia and the mem�randum of Ernest Gellhorn in Joint 
Hearings, 1973. 
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considered here is whether the agency should be allowed to participate 
in informal processes within regulatory bodies. The following 
discussion assumes that the agency will participate in informal 
processes if it so chooses. 
Direct Costs of the Regulatory Process 
Creation of a consumer advocacy agency will increase the 
costs of the regulatory process in three ways. First� if the existence 
of the agency increases the frequency of intervention before regulators, 
the proceedings will undoubtedly take more time. The additional 
intervenor will consume some time presenting its case, the other 
parties will devote additional time to responding to the intervenors, 
and the agency will spend more time extracting a policy or decision 
from the more complex p�oceedings (especially since the presence 
of an intervenor increases the likelihood of appeal). 
The rough correlation between intervention and the duration 
of the process is illustrated by some data that were compiled by my 
colleague Margaret Rouse Bates in connection with a study we a_re 
undertaking of the licensing of nuclear power facilities. Her data 
show the extent of intervention and duration of the eight construction 
permit license cases decided by the Atomic Energy Commission in 
1973. Two cases in which no one attempted to intervene each took 
six months to decide; four cases in which intervention was attempted 
but was either unsuccessful or required to be limited in scope took 
approximately one year to decide; the final two cases in which full 
intervention was granted took twenty and thirty-eitht months, respectively. 
In none of the cases, however, did the intervenors succeed in blocking 
the facility or obtaining major changes in its design. 
The second manner in which a consumer advocacy agency 
increases the direct costs of regulation is through the strategic 
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response of regulated firms to the presence of another force i n  the 
process. They will have to make better presentations before regulators, 
judges and congressmen if their arguments are to be more carefully 
scrutinized. In addition, they will be likely to respond to the creation 
of the agency by increasing their informal lobbying efforts -- at least 
to the extent that the consumer advocacy agency itself must be given 
some lobbying attention._/ 
_/ The la.st point was maOe by Ralph K. Winter, Jr. � in Joint 
Hearings,. 1973, in connection with his argument that �he advocacy 
agency eventu.ally would be captured in the same fashion as were 
regulatory agencies. 
The third way in which the advocate will increase regulatory 
costs is by forcing more proceedings to become formal. A substantial 
amount of the decision-making process in all regulatory agencies 
consists of informal contacts at the staff level between the agency 
and the regulated industry. In some agencies, this process is so 
thorough that formal cases are either rarely heard or perfunctory. 
For example, for over three decades the Federal Communications 
Commission regulated the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
by 11continuous surveillance11 -- which is to say a formal rate hearing 
was never held. At the Atomic Energy Commission, the staff was 
intimately involved with the design of proposed reactors during the 
period in which the agency licensed power facilities� from 1954 to 1974. 
By the time a license application reached the formal hearing stage, 
the staff had already redesigned those features that it thought were 
unsatisfactory; rarely were changes made in reactor design during 
the formal hearing, appeal and full Commission review, even when 
intervenors participated in the process� 
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In many agencies the decision whether to open a case is made 
through informal discussion. The Federal Trade Commission and the 
agencies dealing with product safety, environmental protection and 
other standard-setting policies investigate far more cases than they 
bring to a formal process. Presumably a consumer advocate would 
increase the chance that· a decision would have to be made to continue 
a case to the formal stages, since the decision not to act is, in 
principle, of potentially as much importance as the decision to make 
new policy or to impose different constraints on the regulated firm._/ 
_/ Statement of Robert Pitofsky, Joint I-Ieari:rigs, 1973. 
While converting more cases to formal processes imposes 
additional costs on both regulated firms and the regulatory agency,-/ 
_/ Avoidance of these costs may be the 1notivation of regulators 
to avoid formal proceedings. See Paul L. Joskow, 11Inflation and 
Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public 
Utility Price Regulation, 11 Journal of Law and Ecoriomics, Vol 17 
(October 1974). 
this could be an important source of benefits from an advocacy 
agency as wellG The refusal to undertake a formal process is 
sometimes based upon a desire by the agency to keep its actions 
secret, because the agency is either making unwarranted concessions 
to the industry or covering up a past decision that turned out to be 
mistaken._/ 
_J For some examples of the use of informal agreerrlents to hide 
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decisions that '\Vere either proven to be wrcng or excessively pro­
industry, see the statement of Reuben B. Robertson, Joint Hearings. 
In any case, the consumer advocate is likely to reduce the 
extent of informal decision-making. The courts have been willing to 
chastise agencies for excessive reliance on informal processes, _/ 
_/ For example, Moss v. CAB, 430 Fed. 981 (U. S. District 
Court for the ,District of Columbia, 1970).
so it is reasonable to suppose that the agency can find receptive 
judicial ears should it attack what it regards as an undesirable 
informal process or decision. 
The critics of the advocacy agency are surely correct that 
the agency will increase the costs of regulation by more than the 
budget of the agency. And surely these costs should be weighed 
against the benefits in deciding whether its creation is socially 
desirable. But by itself, this argument does not support a definitive 
judgment about the agency. While the procedural costs generated by 
the agency are likely to be large -- conceivably several times the 
agency1s budget -- these costs are still small compared to the 
estimates of the economic costs of regulation arising from inefficient 
'operation of regulated industries. If the advocacy agency could 
succeed in changing just one of several nonsensical regulatory 
policies -- for example .. the irrational route structure of the trucking 
industry or the rate structure of railroads -- it would recapture the 
costs lt generates by several times over. 
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Spillover Damages 
The debate over the consumer advocacy agency includes 
several issues that emphasize certain gestalt-like consequences of 
the creation of the agency. Two of these have been repeated often 
enough that they must be accorded some attention in a recitation of 
the case against the advocacy agency. They will be but briefly treated 
here, owing to my judgment that they have very little merit.-/ 
_/ Still other arguments will be totally ignored except to 
characterize them in the following partial list: (a) the real aim of 
the proponents of the advocacy agency is to undermine the American 
economic system (statement of John A. Stuart, Consumer Protection 
Legislation, 1971); {b) the consumer advocate will do severe damage 
to businesses by releasing trade secrets (statement by J. Edward Day, 
Joint Hearings, 1973); and (c) the threat of possible intervention gives 
the agency a lever over business to force it to do all sorts of things 
outside of the regulatory process, or, in the words of one apparently 
frightened soul, the agency will have 11unlim.t ed power to search and 
destroy by implication and half-truths11 (statement of Herbert 
Liebenson, Consumer Protection Legislatiot� 1971).
The first such argument is that deregulation is a better 
policy than adding to the complexities of regulation._/
· 
The difficulty 
_/ Statement of Ra�ph K. Winter, Jr. , Joint Hearings. 
with this statement is, of course, the implicit presumption that the 
consumer advocacy agency should be regarded as an alt�rnative to 
deregulation in the instances when a good case can be made for the 
latter. If the advocacy agency truly represents the consumers' 
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interests, it will add another voice to the chorus calling for 
deregulation in the cases in which regulators generate substantial 
costs to consumers. If it is not a consumer advocate, then it will 
not make serious inroads on the cost of regulation -- and will not, 
therefore, reduce the political pressure for deregulation. It is 
instructive that the proponents of the advocacy agency do not even 
intimate that deregulation is an alternative to the advocacy agency; 
most support some deregulation, although they express skepticism 
that deregulation will actually occur._/ 
_/ For example, see the statement of Peter Schuck� Joint 
Hearings. 
In any event, should extensive deregulation take place, a 
substantial regulatory empire will still remain, especially the 
standard-setting activities. There is no compelling reason to 
believe that the desirability of deregulation in one regulatory arena 
reduces whatever desirability is attached to the creation of a 
consumer advocacy agency for the regulatory activities that will not 
be eliminated. 
The second spillover argument is that the advocacy agency 
will destroy the incentive of voluntary trade associations to establish 
industry performance standards._/ Presumably the prevailing 
_/ Statement of John A. Stuart$ Consumer Protection Legislation 
Hearings, 1971.
attitude will be to let the government do it since the consumer advocate 
is unlikely to be pleased with anything industry would do. 
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If the resources of the advocacy agency and standard-setting 
regulators were unlimited, this argument would make some senseo 
The advocacy agency p)_ obably would then want to have a role in all 
standard-setting activities, and the industry would no longer have an 
incentive to perform a function that the government was willing to 
perform for free. But agency resources are limited; the advocacy 
agency will not be able to intervene in more than a tiny fraction of 
cases. As a result, the advocacy agency will be interested in 
deploying its resources where payoffs are high -- which is not towards 
redoing reasonable standards promulgated by industry groups. 
In fact, the presence of a small advocacy agency may 
increase the incentives of an industry to do an effective job of self­
regulation. Apparently the home appliance industry established 
self-regulation with respect to such matters as uniform measures 
of the performance of an appliance {e. g. , cooling capacity of air 
conditioners, storage capacity of refrigerators) largely because it 
feared that if it did not do so, the federal government would regulate 
the industry._/ Creation of a consumer advocacy agency presumably 
_/ Michael S. Hunt, 11Trade Associations and Self-Regulation: 
Major Home Appliances, 11 in Richard E. Caves and Marc Roberts, 
Regulating the Product: Quality and Variety ( Cambridge: Ballinger, 
1975 ). Incidentally, Hunt finds no evidence of anticompetitive effects 
of appliance self-regulation, concluding that it was 11non-controversially 
desirable. 11 
raises the costs of federal regulation to an industry, thereby increasing 
the incentive to avoid regulation through an effective self-regulatory 
scheme. 
' 
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Unrepre sen ta tivene s s 
The most serious challenge to the consumer advocacy 
proposal is the argument that no federal consumerist agency can 
represent consumers. r he reasons for the claim are: (a) the 
agency is too removed from consumers in that they do not elect its 
leaders or support it voluntarily, so that it is unlikely to face much 
incentive -- or even to gain enough information to determine how -­
to benefit its natural constituency; and (b) the consumer interest is 
nonexistent in that differences in taste, income, age� residence and 
numerous other demographic characteristics make consumers too 
diverse a group to be well represented by a single advocate. 
The truth of these contentions, as theoretical matters, 
cannot be contested. The economics literature on impossibility 
theorems, compensation principles and second-best problems should 
give anyone pause before claiming that any action -- or inaction -­
clearly produces net social benefits, particularly when implementation 
of a policy requires the deployinent of a characteristically unresponsive 
bureaucratic institution. 
In fact, the problem may be even somewhat worse than has 
been suggested in the debate over the consumer advocacy agency. 
Regulation is, in principle at least, socially desirable when information 
costs are so large that the consumer has insufficient incentive to 
make himself informed enough to engage in optimal consumption 
decisions. As Tullock has pointed out, exactly the same phenomenon 
occurs when the voter must determine which candidate -- and, 
implicitly, public policies �- to vote for.-1 As long as the unanticipated 
_/ Gordon Tullock, 11The Social Costs of R educing Social Costs, 11 
mimeographed, 1972.
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consequences of consumption are, in expected value, less than the 
costs of information, a case may be made for standards regulation; 
however, a voter has little chance of actually affecting an election, 
and hence he has little incentive to learn which of the competing 
candidates will adopt the best regulatory policy. To make the circle 
complete, as argued above he also has little incentive to join a 
voluntary consu:mer group that will lobby politicians and regulators 
for him. 
This dilemma, however, is not just a trait of regulatory 
policy -- and is not the one that motivated the title of this paper. 
Lacking the magical world of Lindahl pricing organized by an all­
knowing philosopher-king, public good provision must always diverge 
from the optimum optimorump whether the public good be national 
defense, a television program, information about a product or a 
safety standard._/ To say that bureaucracy is unresponsive and the 
-' A nLindahl system11 is one in which each person is taxed 
exactly in proportion to the value he places on governmental activity. 
Its impracticality is legend. See, for example, Paul A. Samuelson, 
11Pure Theory of Public Expenditures and Taxation," in J. Margolis 
and H. Guitton, Public Economics, New York: St. Martin1s Press, 
1969. 
political process incapable of finding a unique optimum set of policies 
is, then, to say very little while saying very inuch. The argument 
is no more destructive of the proposal for an advocacy agency than· it 
is supportive, since the agencies with which the advocate must deal 
will also be unresponsive and unrepresentative for the same set of 
reasons. Nor is it even an a.rgument for ana.rchy: in a sense, a 
social arrangement that provides no public goods, no matter how 
valuablep is remarkably unresponsive and unrepresentative! 
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The relevant representation issues for policy purposes are 
(1)  whether in some important instances a widespread consun�er 
interest can be identified and (2) whether, assuming a.homogeneous 
consumer interest does exist, an advocacy agency is likely to pursue 
it. The second issue depends upon the motives, incentives and 
powers of the agency, and will be taken up in the next session. The 
answer to the former seems trivially to be yes. Few consunlers 
stand to gain if an industry is able to convince a standard-setting 
agency that it should adopt performance standards that reduce 
competition within the industry but that make little or no contribu­
tion to the safety and quality of the product. Few consume rs stand 
to gain from cartelization of industry pricing, such as takes place 
in transportation regulation, or from false information about product 
costs and perfor1nance. The main potential problem is \vhether the 
agency will focus its efforts on these types of issues, or will, instead, 
degenerate into a representative of a few add�tiQnal, narrow interests. 
Conclusions About the Opponents 
Like the proponents, the opponents of the consumer advocacy 
agency have relied on a set of theoretical arguments that, in the main, 
reduce to truisms. What the opponents have succeeded in showing 
is that a consumer advocate will increase the resources committed 
to the regulatory process but will not perfectly represent what is 
intrinsj cally unrep·resentable. 
Heading into the home stretch of the paper, neither side of 
the debate has left us with very much. The proponents have a good 
case that regulation often works to the detriment of the interests of 
consumers and that the advocate will change outcomes, but they 
really avoid the issue of whether the outcomes will be better. 
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Meanwhile the opponents have shown us that the change will have a 
cost and will not produce perfection. 
What is lacking are some details on what the change will be 
like, so that at least individually we can judge for ourselves whether 
there ought to be an agency for consumer advocacy. 
PREDICTING THE EFFECTS OF THE ADVOCATE 
The consumer advocacy agency will be an unusual agency. 
In some ways it will resemble a regulated firm, in that its success 
will be dependent upon how it fares before regulatory agencies. Yet� 
like the regulators, its budget and authority will flow from Congress. 
Let us assu.fne that Congress is not completely insincere in 
setting up a consumer advocacy agency. In part, Congressmen expect 
the agency to have some effect on re gulatory outcomes. Hence the 
agency will be rewarded according to the changes it can take credit 
for, the reviews of its perforn�ance in the media, and, of course, 
the favors it can do for the Congress. With respect to the last, the 
advocate might be able to deliver two types of favors: support from 
the constituency of the agency, and relief from complaints by the 
constituents of the Congressmen. Furthermore, to the extent that the 
agency, like the adjudicatory branches of the Department of Justice, 
becomes in large measure a training ground for young lawyers on 
their way to partnerships in Washington law firms, the desire to 
win cases will become a greater feature of the ·agency' s  behavior. 
Like the regulated firm, the success qf the advocate will 
depend upon its ability to develop a cordial relationship with the 
regulatory agencies. Friendly relations will benefit the advocate 
by easing its problems of collecting information, by leading the regula­
tory agency to consider its argwnents more seriously, and simply by 
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enabling it to avoid unpleasant personal relations among individuals 
who must maintain relatively frequent contact. 
This behavior stands in contrast to that of the voluntary 
activist organization. For the same reasons that consumers are 
generally less well represented in the regulatory process, those that 
are represented tend to be the ones who feel most passionately about 
the issues and whose tastes lead them to prefer an atypically great 
degree of govermnent intervention into market transactions. They 
are likely to have above average income (the voluntary contribution 
to the activist organization means less to them), and above average 
sophistication about products {they care more about consumer issues, 
and therefore have more incentive to learn about product costs,, 
quality, safety, etc. ). Finally, since even for an activist the direct 
economic payoff to members of the voluntary association is unlikely 
to be large compared to its expenditures, activism is likely itself to 
be in part a consumption activity -- that is, hopeless fights against 
egregious but unchallengeable decisions may be enjoyable. 
The preceeding argument suggests that the consumer advocacy 
agency will behave somewhat differently than the voluntary consumerist. 
The advocacy agency, with its greater incentiye to produce concrete 
results attributable to its actions, will allocate its resources more 
toward iss.ues - that it can actually influence. That is to say that it 
will deal with agencies that are more flexible in their policies or that 
are vulnerable to appeals bas.ed upon the claim that their policies are 
illegal. The agency is also more likely than the voluntary activist 
organization to compromise with a regulatory agency and its regulated 
industry. 
An illustrative example of the kind of interventions the agency 
is likely to undertake, according to this argument, is provided by 
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the intervention o f  the planning office of the Department o f  Transporta­
tion in the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation of the Civil Aero­
nautics Board in the early 1970s.-/ In the proceedings DOT adopted 
_/ A first -hand account of DOT1s role in the process can be found 
in George W. Douglas and James C. Miller III, Economic Regulation 
of D'omestic Air Transport: Theory and Policy, Brookings Institution, 
Washington, D. C. , ·1974, Chapter 8.
a subdued posture that aimed for objectives that were moderate in 
comparison with, say, those of the general run of acade:rnic economists 
who have atudied the agency and called for substantial deregulation. 
DOT did not question the desirability of CAB regulation and did not 
attempt to inflµence all aspects of the DPFI. Rather, it had three 
aims: ( 1 )  to make the agency consider explicitly the tradeoff between 
price and service quality in its pricing decisions; (2) to obtain adoption 
of cost-based, rather than value-of-service, pricing; and (3 )  to intro­
duce some 11fare flexibility11 -- that is, to make the maximum allowable 
fare differ from the minimum. If fact, the CAB1 s ultimate decision 
adopted most of DOT1s ideas with respect to the first and the second 
aims, and the DOT participants with justification made a modest claim 
to having influenced matters. 
The primary point of this example is to describe the style and 
methods that one government agency adopted in intervening on behalf 
of consumers in the proceedings of another agency. In contrast to 
the interventions of conswnerist and environ.mentalist voluntary groups, 
the DOT presentation was highly specific in content, moderate in 
objectives, and cooperative with the agency. In return for this behavior, 
the CAB reciprocated by frequently referencing the submissions of 
DOT in laudatory terms� 
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Of course, the gains achieved by DOT have been assessed 
by even the participants as something less than revolutionary. The 
CAB decided to set fares on the basis of the costs associated with 
11target11 load factors of plane.s. The decision probably will benefit 
consumers, but not nearly so much as would trunk line deregulation. 
And DOT did fail to achieve what was probably the objective that would 
have been most beneficial -·- the adoption of flexible fares -- since 
that proposal offered the prospect of destablizing the cartel arrange­
ments. of the industry. The lesson of the DOT intervention at the CA.B 
is probably that modest objectives beget modest results -- but results 
nonetheless. 
While the consumer advocacy agency will be more closely 
connected to consumerists than was DOT, the incentives for moderation 
\Vill nevertheless operate upon it. As a result, it is unlikely to engage 
in extreme, highly controversial consumerist activities, as has been 
the fear of some of its opponents, particularly as long as its budget 
prevents it from entering more than a small proportion of regulatory 
is sues, In particular, it is unlikely to seek regulatory policies that 
limit the legal range of consumer products to those deemed most 
desirable by the activist, middle-class consumer since its incentives 
will differ from those of the private activist organizations. A more 
likely result is that the agency will be too timid, settling for small 
but clear-cut victories rather than running a high risk of a major 
gain. 
One other danger arises from the result-orientation of the 
agency, The nature of the adversary process is such that a participant 
in it, when having the choice of issues in which to intervene, has a 
greater like"lihood of success against relatively poorly represented 
groups, Consunierists, of course, do not constitute the only group 
that is vulnerable to a steamroller fueled by a wealthy interest group. 
The advocacy agency, too could take on steamroller proportions against 
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groups less well-represented than consumers. All other things being 
equal, an agency can expect to have greater success in affecting changes 
by picking on disorganized groups, individuals and small businesses. 
In fact, a Machiavellian purpose is even served by really laying into 
a few defenseless 11violators11 of the consumers1 interests: occasionally 
hitting mules and/ or businessmen with a plank is useful in getting their 
attention. Of course, it is not likely that Congress would reward an 
agency that devoted most of its resources to lambasting individuals; 
at the same time, the temptation to engage in a few such activities 
will surely be pre sent. 
An example of how this would happen is for the consumer 
advocate to press for expensive, retroactive compensatory actions by a 
firm or industry in connection with a regulatory decision to upgrade the 
safety standards of its product. The early decisions of the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission exhibit some tendency to engage in severe 
punishment of small firms producing products the CPSC determines 
to be unsafe. For example, preliminary decisions in a case against 
a small manufacturer of an arc-welder not only forced the firm to adopt 
a safer design, but also required actions with respect to past customers 
that will probably bankrupt the company -- even though there is no 
record that the arc-welder ever injured anyone . _/ Meanwhile, the 
_/ Consumer Product Safety Commission Docket 74-4, Interim 
Initial Decision and Order, April 29, 1975.
proceedings to establish industry standards for lawnmowers -- which 
are among the leaders in preventable deaths and injuries -- indicate 
that the agency will adopt standards that will significantly reduce the 
hazard of the product, but wi�l not require retrofitting, replacement 
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or refunds for past purchases . -/ A s ide from the Machiavellian 
_/Consumer P roduct Safety Commission, Power Lawn Equipment 
Proceeding for the Development of Safety Standard. {Notice: Federal 
Register V. 39, No. 141 (July 22, 1 9 74) . )
benefit s  of arbitrarines s, it is difficult to understand why law and 
agency policy should permit these unequal treatments which appear 
to be based on the resources of the regulated entity rather than on 
justice and merit. 
:f.Ierein lies the dilemma of consumer advocacy. The agency 
must be small enough so that it does not intervene everywhere, but it 
must be large enough to intervene effectively against well-represented 
p roducer groups, such as the t rade ass ociations in transportation, 
the major firms affecting energy and environmental policies, and 
even Ma Bell. Yet to make it a potentially effective opponent of these 
groups requires that it have sufficeint resources to overwhelm the 
ins ignificant firm or individual finding himself before a regulatory 
agency - - or even having his fate decided by a regulator without his 
knowledge. The dilemma is compounded by the expectation expressed 
above that the agency is likely to be more moderate in its aims when 
dealing with the more potent firms and more inflexible agencie s ,  
Although this i s  not exactly synonymous with a tendency t o  score big 
victories in tiny battles while winning tiny incremental changes in the 
wars that really count, there is certainly a tendency in that direction. _) 
_) This conclusion probably is amenable to empirical testingQ 
Several states have e stablished consumer protection agencies, hut to 
my knowledge their behavior has never been the object of s cholarly 
study. 
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A s  with most problems of the ins titutional design o f  public 
policy implementation, the foremost conclusion that one can reach is 
that no unqualified conclusion i s  justified. If  one generally favors most 
of the standard- setting regulatory activities of the federal government 
and some of the price and profit regulation, one probably must conclude 
that a consumer advocacy agency is worth trying. This conclusion 
is based in part on self-interest: the more one likes these kinds of 
regulation, the less likely it is that one is threatened by the poss ibility 
of suffering an unjustifiable loss to the agency by being overmatched 
by it. But the conclusion is also partly based on the obse rvation 
that the instances where regulation is most justified - - namely, the 
control of externalities, severe information problems, and monopolistic 
practices by giant natural monopolies - - are the very ones in which 
regulators are ripest for capture through a firm1 s strategic use of 
information and the inability of the political system to make an informed 
judgment on the performance of the regulatory agency. Threat though 
it may be, a consumer advocacy agency is probably the only mechanism 
yet devised that holds some promise of dealing with this problem. 
